There was a chance that Michelle Bachelet would win Chile’s
Presidential election outright in the November 17 round of voting. In fact there was mention of an election “tsunami”
from within her Nueva Mayoría team of
advisors, who, besides running what most observers term an errorless campaign, exuded
confidence she could win the required majority-plus-one votes against Evelyn
Matthei of the right wing Alianza (and
7 other candidates) to avoid a runoff election.
But even though she came close, that did not happen. She received 46.7% of the votes to Matthei’s
25%, so the two will spend another month campaigning. Bachelet clearly won big,
so she only needs to keep her supporters interested enough to return to the
polls on December 15, and gather enough additional votes from people who
supported the secondary candidates, to maintain her distance from Matthei. None of these losing candidates has promised
to support her and deliver votes of their supporters to her cause, and since
she is not in serious need of cutting a deal with any of these candidates to
defend her victory in the second round, she will not offer any of them much to
join her effort.
Matthei, on the other hand, must devise a strategy that
significantly attracts an additional block of voters to catch up to Bachelet’s
comfortable lead, which most observers feel is highly unlikely. One might think
that, since only about 50% of the qualified voters actually cast votes in the
election, there should be fertile ground “out there” to entice new voters to
get in the game and participate in the runoff election. Difficult, but not out of the question, so
Matthei has changed here team to include younger members of her coalition, some
who won congressional seats in the first round election and hence have proven
access and acceptability to important populations of voters. But can she change her message to one that convinces enough voters that she and her cohort care as much about normal Chileans and their struggles to feed, house, educate, and keep healthy their families. Bachelet has done that, but Matthei has not.
So what is likely to happen is that Bachelet will keep her
campaign staff in place (why change a winning team, after all!), but try to reach
further into the large group of Chileans who did not vote in the first round;
skewed towards the young, the poor, and the self-proclaimed “disaffected”, the “indignados”, some of whom just might
shelve their skepticism temporarily and join the parade in support of her
program of free education for all, tax reform to produce the additional
resources needed for this educational reform as well as much needed improvements
to the public health system, and a new constitution freed of the trappings
of the present constitution that originated in the Pinochet dictatorship.
The Presidential election is only half the story (well, maybe
three quarters). On November 17, Chilean
voters also elected Senators to the upper house (Senate), and Deputies to the
lower house (Chamber) of what they call their Parliament (Legislature). If Bachelet is to be successful at
implementing her reform-rich program, she will need support in the legislative branch, and
this election gave her a majority in both houses. Candidates from the parties making up
Bachelet’s campaign coalition will hold 21 seats in the Senate compared to 16
from the opposition; in the House they will hold a 67 to 49 advantage. This balance (or unbalance, if you wish),
should allow Bachelet to win legislative approval for most of the programs and
reforms she has campaigned on, although many of these are still very highly
generalized and lacking in a fair, detailed assessment of the costs and benefits (monetary and social)
associated with each.
One aspect of the “Pinochet” constitution that is attracting
a lot of attention and much criticism from a wide range of constitutionalists, politicians,
and segments of civil society is what is referred to as “special
quorums”. These apply with certain types
of legislative proposals that require more than a majority vote to pass; some require
60% and others, such as constitutional reforms, require 75%. It is this latter special quorum that is
complicating Bachelet’s campaign promise to create a “new constitution”,
because it would allow the opposition to vote en bloc against her proposals for
reform. (Observers of the gridlocked US
Congress are all too familiar with this tool of power afforded to the minority
to stymie, for better or for worse, the will of the majority.) While it is not
a given that the right wing minority would object to any and all constitutional
reforms requiring this level of approval, it is certainly likely. Hence, believing that this special quorum of
75% is a trap that will inevitably lead to failure of Bachelet to produce a new
constitution using the present institutional framework (legislative branch), and
in the process preclude her from eliminating these special quorums from the
constitution, there is an outcry from a broad range of the Chilean public for an
alternative approach, the creation of a “constituent assembly”, to draw up
Bachelet’s new constitution.
Matthei and the right parties have been roundly defeated in
this election, so far. The right is not
as coherent and disciplined politically as the left, and under Bachelet’s guiding
hand the left coalition formed to obtain Bachelet’s election has become more
inclusive by welcoming the Communist Party into the coalition while keeping the
more centrist Christian Democrats also in house. It is one thing for a party like the
Communists to join the campaign, but another to join her government once she is
elected. It is pretty clear that this
time, differing from the first time she was President, Bachelet will form her
government with less of a need to succumb to influence from the leadership of the political parties who supported her
campaign. (Polls show that while Bachelet is popular, the political parties that support her are not.) Bachelet probably has her government pretty much staffed and first steps planned, but some observers believe that because of this second round of voting
there is still room for Matthei and her Alianza
supporters to influence how and with whom Bachelet eventually governs. This is more apt to occur if Matthei is able to challenge Bachelet's proposed program enough to seed doubts about its effects, and its eventual costs. There will be at least one face-to-face debate, something that did not effectively happen in the first round, so Matthei has at least that chance to show to the voting public (and the previous non-voting public) what she and the right think are the serious shortfalls of Bachelet's program.
A strong showing in the runoff by Matthei, which would
require expanding her vote count considerably, might temper how Bachelet
interprets her mandate and influence her choices when she finally names her team to
govern and determines her priorities. On
the other hand, a weak showing by the right could result in an even more
overwhelming victory in the runoff election and leave Bachelet with the even
greater feeling that she has won a clear mandate for her
program, and can proceed unfettered.
One interesting and indicative decision Bachelet made almost
immediately after winning the first round election was to enlist the support of
four attractive young victors of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to join her
in public campaign events. These are the
very attractive past leaders of the student movement, who took to the streets
over the past two years to force politicians and public opinion to pay
attention to important social issues like education, health care, and equity of
opportunity and wealth which have been begging for attention and reform for
years. These leaders of the future campaigned under Bachelet's Nueva Mayoría banner and having
parlayed their popularity into electoral victory will join the Chamber of
Deputies in March, bringing fresh energy to that often stodgy body. Three of them have joined the Communist Party, and as
such the Party has doubled the seats it holds in that body from 3 members to 6. These former student protest leaders all were once vociferous critics of
Bachelet, and even now openly proclaim that they are joining the legislative
branch initially within her coalition, but with only one foot, while the other
they are keeping in the street with their comrades of the civil social movement. Time will tell if they drink Bachelet’s Kool
Aid, or she drinks theirs. It also remains to be seen how independent of their party these young legislators will be.
So are Chileans turning their backs on the policies and
practices that have given the country economic progress for the past two plus
decades? Are the Chilean voters
indifferent to what it will take to fulfill the recently released OECD
projection that Chile’s will be the most dynamic economy in the biennium 2014-15
of all the 34 members of this club of developed and emerging economies? Will Bachelet, in her drive to make Chile a
more “just and equitable” society still be able to deliver economic growth of
4.5% in 2014 and 4.9% in 2015 as projected by the OECD analysts? To put this in context, compare these numbers to projections for the US (2.9% and
3.4%) or the EU (1.0% and 1.6%). Some local
analysts and commentators are drawing the conclusion that this election may be
showing that Chileans are as interested in social growth (equity,
participation, environmental health) as they are in economic growth, and while
they may still want growth, they are willing for that rate of aggregate growth
to be slower than it has been, if by slowing down and limiting the excesses and abuses of their relatively free market economy they can attend to some of
their social needs better.
In some ways it all looks a lot like Chile in 1970, when the Allende
government raced to socialize the Chilean economy and society, self destructing
(with a lot of help from the opposition and other enemies) with the resultant
calamity the results of which still infect Chilean society and politics. This is the outcome of a Bachelet victory that the likes of the Wall Street Journal and other conservative analysts are predicting (or fearing). But it also looks a lot like Bachelet may in a way be
Chile’s Barack Obama. The reform wave
she is riding feels a lot like the vibes around Obama’s victory in 2008. Even her speeches sound a bit like his, and
her endless promises while exciting, add up to an impossible agenda her
inability for whatever reason to implement run the risk of leading to high
levels of disappointment (like Obama also). Admittedly, Obama was not proposing the drafting of a new constitution like she is, nor was he a self-defined Socialist like she is.
For Chile’s sake, one can only hope that Bachelet is more capable of setting realistic priorities, corralling her supporters to her side consistently to promote and implement her program, and that the Chilean legislative branch can avoid the costly, divisive partisan gridlock Obama has faced for his entire time in office.
For Chile’s sake, one can only hope that Bachelet is more capable of setting realistic priorities, corralling her supporters to her side consistently to promote and implement her program, and that the Chilean legislative branch can avoid the costly, divisive partisan gridlock Obama has faced for his entire time in office.
But wait…our work is not done here. No summary and no conclusions quite yet. There is more campaigning, another vote on
the 15th of December, and a government to form in March of 2014. Let’s keep watching. These Chileans are truly quite entertaining as they struggle to rebuild an economy, a society, and a democracy.
Viva Chile.
Posted in Santiago, Chile on November 20,2013